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The Influence of Tax Labeling and Tax Earmarking on the 
Willingness to Contribute – A Conjoint Analysis
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We apply conjoint analysis to study the influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking on 
German taxpayers’ willingness to contribute. From a survey based sample we show that 
labeling and earmarking effects can substantially increase participants’ willingness to 
contribute, which results in a considerable deviation from a pure consumption maximizing 
behavior. Furthermore, we give an explanation for this effect regarding socio-demographic 
attributes of German taxpayers. These results explain the variety in tax labels and provide 
implications for tax policy regarding further reforms of the tax and contribution system: 
“Labeling” and “earmarking” of contributions are important instruments in “selling” policies 
and increasing tax revenue. 
 
Keywords 
Behavioral Taxation · Tax Labeling · Tax Earmarking · Willingness to Contribute · Conjoint 
Analysis · Perceived Tax Burden 
 
JEL Classification  
D03 · H20 · H51 · H52 · K34 
 
                                                 
*   This is a revised version of our earlier working paper: „The Name Game for Contributions – Influence of 
Labeling and Earmarking on the Perceived Tax Burden“, FACTS Discussion Paper, School of Business & 
Economics, FU Berlin, Nr. 2010/12. 
  Author of correspondence: Christian Sielaff, Department of Finance, Accounting and Taxation, Freie 
Universität Berlin, Garystraße 21, 14195 Berlin, Germany. E-mail: christian.sielaff@fu-berlin.de.   2
Contents 
 
List of Tables..............................................................................................................................3 
1. Introduction............................................................................................................................4 
2. Literature Review...................................................................................................................5 
3. Conceptual framework...........................................................................................................7 
3.1 Research hypothesis.........................................................................................................7 
3.2 Method ...........................................................................................................................10 
3.3 Sample............................................................................................................................11 
3.4 Operationalization of the Hypotheses............................................................................14 
4. Results..................................................................................................................................16 
4.1 Analysis of Ranking Behavior .......................................................................................16 
4.2 Influence of Labeling.....................................................................................................18 
4.2.1 Education Allowance ..............................................................................................18 
4.2.2 Health Insurance Premium......................................................................................22 
4.3 Influence of Earmarking.................................................................................................23 








   3
List of Tables 
Table 1 - Distribution of Quota Attributes...............................................................................13 
Table 2 - Contribution Combinations of Stimuli in Complete Design ....................................15 
Table 3 - Total Contributions and Net Income ........................................................................16 
Table 4 - Reference Sequence..................................................................................................17 
Table 5 - Average Rank Placement of the Individual Stimuli .................................................17 
Table 6 - Part Worth Utilities and Relative Significance (Non-Earmarking Group)...............20 
Table 7 - Sequences “Pro Education Allowance” with Non-Earmarking................................21 
Table 8 -  Part Worth Utilities separated by Groups “Education Allowance” and “No 
Education Allowance”..............................................................................................22 
Table 9 - Part Worth Utilities and Relative Significance (Earmarking Group).......................24 
Table 10 - Sequence “Pro Education Allowance” with Earmarking .......................................25 
Table 11 - Explanation of the Labeling Effect with respect to individual attributes...............26   4
1. Introduction 
Throughout the world taxes are labeled in creative ways. For example, taxes were named as 
“solidarity surcharge” for the former Eastern part of Germany, as “miner residential 
construction charges” or as a “fire brigade tax”. Other examples outside the tax system are 
state lotteries that are promoted to “help the children” or welfare payments for promoting 
social fairness. This paper provides empirical evidence as to whether these instruments 
decrease taxpayers’ resistance to taxation and increase the acceptance of different taxes and 
contributions. 
Studies on the willingness to evade taxes have shown that many taxpayers seem to attach 
positive connotations to taxes and further contributions as long as these contributions are 
consistent with their own sense of fairness and they find the contributions reasonable. 
Therefore, the attributes of a contribution such as its labeling and its possible earmarking may 
influence the individual evaluation of this duty and the subjective willingness to contribute. 
This study applies conjoint analysis to measure the influence of labeling and earmarking on 
the willingness to contribute. Conjoint analysis as an empirical method gives study 
participants the opportunity to rank different combinations of attributes. This method was 
used to determine how the naming of a contribution (labeling) as well as its designated use 
(earmarking) affects the acceptance of this contribution in the population.  
This question is both of theoretical and political relevance. For theoretical research, it is 
important to analyze whether the traditional assumption of net income maximizing behavior 
holds for tax labeling and earmarking and which instruments can influence this behavior. 
From a political perspective, knowledge of the effects of labeling and earmarking 
contributions could be used to explain the variety of tax systems as well as to increase the 
acceptance of tax systems and, where applicable, to minimize tax avoidance strategies and 
evasion behavior.  
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a short literature review. Section 3 
discusses the conceptual framework as well as the used method and the data. Section 4 
presents the main results of the study. The final section concludes by summarizing and 
discussing key findings.   5
2. Literature Review 
The starting point of the tax earmarking discussion in modern public finance is Buchanan 
(1963). He analyzes the economic effects of earmarked taxes and their influence on the 
individual’s behavior within a theoretical model. He also discloses differences between 
earmarking and general-fund financing under restrictive model assumptions. Based on his 
work, Goetz (1968) develops a modified model and shows that the normative conclusions 
become less determinate under less restrictive assumptions. McCleary (1991) extends the 
theoretical models with World Bank case studies. He comes to the result that earmarking does 
not work very well in real settings. Durand, Klemmack and Lee Roff (1982) use cluster 
analyses to segment the respondents of a survey regarding their priorities for federal 
expenditures. They argue that the preferences for various expenditure programs differ on the 
basis of demographic and social psychological differences between the respondents and 
suggest the development of communication programs to inform the public about programs 
and goals in a more efficient manner. Based on these results, our study analyzes how the 
acceptance of a contribution is influenced by the information on its label and its earmarking. 
Furthermore, we analyze relevant demographical attributes to explain a potential increase in 
acceptance. 
The effects of labeling and earmarking taxes are often discussed in papers that address the 
incentives of tax evasion. The focus of many studies is the impact of the public use of 
taxpayers’ money on the willingness to evade taxes. Schmölders (1959), with further 
references, presents the results of a survey in Germany regarding general tax-mindedness and 
the moral assessment of tax dodging. He comes to the result that most respondents do not see 
tax dodging as a criminal activity and do not differ between taxes, voluntary contributions and 
fees. Kolm (1973) provides a basis for this in that he explicitly integrates the utility of public 
goods, which were financed through taxes involved in tax evasion decisions in an evasion 
model. Vogel (1974) determines through surveys that, in Sweden, the willingness to evade 
taxes decreased when the tax payment was accompanied by a certain consideration. Lewis 
(1979) reaches similar conclusions for Great Britain. Van de Braak (1983) offers a theoretical 
framework for the definition of tax resistance and discusses findings about tax compliance 
and tax mentality. Baldry (1986) shows that a difference between gambling and tax evasion is 
the existence of ‘moral costs’ in a situation deciding on the latter.  
For a detailed survey about tax morale, see Torgler (2002) and Alm et al. (1995). 
Furthermore, experiments conducted by Spicer and Becker (1980) as well as Fortin et al.   6
(2007) show that the willingness to evade taxes decreases the higher the degree of the 
perceived tax justness and tax fairness. A model theoretical explanation for this is provided by 
Cowell (1992). Feld and Tyran (2002) conduct a laboratory experiment and come to the result 
that the higher the participants estimate the tax compliance of others to be, the higher their 
own tax morale. Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1992) come to the conclusion that individuals 
exhibit a great deal of diversity in their behavior towards taxation. They further determine that 
the main reasons for tax compliance are the overweighting of the low probability of audit and 
the taxpayers’ valuation of public goods. Kim, Evans and Moser (2005) give a comprehensive 
explanation of the tax-reporting decisions and why they cannot be predicted accurately by 
conventional economic analysis. Harbaugh, Mayr and Burghart (2007) show that both 
required contributions and voluntary payments to a non-profit organization lead to similar 
brain activity amongst test persons as payments in their favor. In this observation, the authors 
see confirmation both for the motive of pure altruism and the motive of a “warm glow of 
giving”, which is the benefit that the test person receives through his/her own voluntary 
donation.  
A related body of literature attempts to measure subjective tax effects of contributions and 
subjective judgments of their fairness. According to Frey and Eichenberger (1996), the 
opportunity for taxpayers to participate in political tax questions is sufficient to increase tax 
satisfaction. These results are also verified by the results of Feld and Tyran (2002), who 
confirm a positive correlation between political participation and tax compliance. A detailed 
survey about tax fairness and tax justice is provided by Kirchler (2007) with further 
references.  
Recently, the labeling and earmarking effect has become more and more important in both the 
economic and the psychological literature. Löfgren and Nordblom (2009) show that labeling 
can significantly affect attitudes towards a tax. According to their survey conducted in 
Sweden, a gasoline tax meets a stronger reluctance than the same tax when it is labeled as 
CO2 tax on gasoline. Hardisty et al. (2010) analyze the effect of attribute framing on choice, 
labeling charges for environmental costs as either an earmarked tax or an offset. They find 
that the effect of attribute labeling depends on different political affiliations. 
The general behavioral economics literature dismisses the usual assumptions made in 
economics about individual preferences. The basic deviations are that individuals act 
imperfectly rationally and that they hold non-standard preferences. Congdon et al. (2009) 
analyze the implications of behavioral economics for tax policy. They find that the welfare   7
consequences are ambiguous if taxpayers do not decide rationally. For example, people are 
not only self-interested but also care about the welfare of others (Andreoni and Miller 2002). 
McCaffery and Baron (2006) with further references report findings of several experiments 
about perceptions of various tax-law design aspects. They come to the result that politicians 
can manipulate public opinion by tax system design, for example by using a “bonus” instead 
of a “penalty” (see Schelling 1984, p. 19 f.).  
Based on the assumptions of behavioral economics literature this study explains the 
deviations from net income maximizing and pure self-interested behavior of taxpayers by 
analyzing the influence of tax labeling and tax earmarking. Our study shows that taxpayers’ 
behavior deviates systematically and considerably from consumption maximization.  
This study builds upon previous results and enhances the status quo of research in two ways. 
On the one hand, we explicitly distinguish between a labeling and an earmarking effect on the 
willingness to contribute. On the other hand, we use conjoint analyses as a new method for 
this field of research to determine the willingness of German taxpayers to contribute. Conjoint 
analysis, well known in psychological and marketing research, is superior to survey based 
studies in the analysis of the willingness to contribute.    
 
3. Conceptual framework 
3.1 Research hypothesis 
The reference point of our analysis is a taxpayer who aims to maximize his net consumption 
potential (called “reference” in the following). This net income maximizing behavior builds 
the initial point for evaluating the influences of labeling and earmarking on the willingness to 
contribute. The study does not aim to test the rational and self-interested “homo oeconomicus” 
model but rather to explore preferences for different tax policies and the influence of labeling 
and earmarking on that.  
We consider three kinds of contributions: Income tax, health insurance premium and 
education allowance. The individual consumption potential is reduced by each of these 
contributions. In our analysis, each contribution may be low or high. Each possible 
combination of these contributions presents a treatment for the conjoint analysis. The specific 
contributions in our analysis have no direct monetary influence on the taxpayer’s net income, 
either because such direct considerations do not occur (income tax, education allowance) or   8
because their amount is explicitly assumed to remain unchanged (health insurance coverage). 
Thus, a pure net income maximizer would prefer low contributions.  
According to this hypothesis, the name of a contribution (labeling) cannot influence the 
taxpayer’s willingness to contribute because he aims to maximize his net income. Any 
potential statement of the designated use (earmarking) cannot affect the willingness to 
contribute as long as it deals with a matter in which the particular contribution amount does 
not directly increase the taxpayer’s consumption potential.   
The initial hypothesis under the assumption of a net income maximizer is stated as follows:  
1 H :   For a given gross pay amount and given consideration from the system of contributions, 
taxpayers will choose the net income maximizing combination from a set of different 
combinations. 
Now the contra thesis to H1 must be developed. The subjective willingness to contribute, and 
thus the decision between combinations of contributions, could be influenced by the labeling 
of a contribution. Whereas in net income maximization, every type of contribution burden that 
causes a decrease in the individual consumption potential should be avoided, taxpayers could 
in reality factor the labeling of a contribution into their net burden calculations and with that, 
also into their decisions, even if their own consumption potential decreases in the process.  
In addition to the egoistic behavior, the target function is now extended to include a limited 
egoistic or even an altruistic motive. A contribution labeled for example as a general 
education allowance could therefore receive wider acceptance among taxpayers than a 
contribution labeled as a tax if, for instance, taxes are associated with wastefulness by many 
taxpayers. The first contra thesis to H1 reads as follows: 
2 H :  The labeling of a contribution influences the willingness to contribute and therefore, the 
selection of taxpayers between combinations of contributions.  
However, at this juncture, one must consider that the pure labeling of a contribution (e.g., 
education allowance) does not initially reveal anything about the concrete use of this 
contribution. The general labeling education allowance does not state whether the revenues 
from this contribution will be used, for example, to fund schools, universities, or general 
education projects such as community colleges, libraries, or museums. Certainly, this 
assumption holds only for a “one-shot-game”. In the long run, taxpayers are able to observe if 
the money has been used according to the initial pledge of the government and this will   9
definitely influence the taxpayer’s choice for the following rounds. Based on this study, 
further research should analyze the long run influence of labeling. In this study, only a “one-
shot-game” is assumed.    
The other tested contra thesis pertains to the appropriation (earmarking) of a contribution. 
Taxes are – in contrast to social contributions – usually not provided with appropriations 
(Non-Earmarking Principle, see e.g., McCleary 1991, p. 82). However, a non-enforceable 
political “pledge” could be given for a particular allocation of funds. In this way, 
appropriations would be possible for social contributions as well as for taxes.  
It is questionable whether an appropriation can increase the acceptance of a contribution 
(McCleary 1991, p. 85). If taxpayers consider a particular cause for which a contribution is 
designated especially worthwhile, then they might be willing to accept a decrease in their 
consumption potential in order to support this cause. A similar behavioral pattern arises, for 
instance, concerning the willingness to give donations to non-profit organizations or 
particularly worthy causes. Accordingly, wage earners could, instead of choosing the 
alternative which offers them the highest net income, intentionally relinquish a portion of 
their consumption potential in order to support an allocation of funds that they consider 
worthwhile, without receiving a concrete service in return. 
In this study, the study participants were divided into two groups to model the appropriation 
and the concrete use of the education allowance. One of these groups did not receive any 
detailed information regarding the use of the education allowance. The other group was 
informed about the concrete use of this contribution: Fifty percent of the education allowance 
was to be dispersed to schools and vocational schools, 25% to colleges and universities, and 
25% to preschool education, since it was expected that the eligibility for the financing of this 
cause would, in general, be viewed positively by the population.  
Two different conjoint analyses were conducted: 
  In the first conjoint analysis, study participants were explicitly told that the tax revenue 
from the tested contribution (education allowance) was not earmarked. In this setting, 
solely a labeling effect was to be active. 
  In the second conjoint analysis an earmarked education allowance was tested. In this 
case, both a labeling effect and definite earmarking were present.    10
This approach leads to the proposition of an additional sub-hypothesis as well as a contra 
hypothesis to  1 H : 
3 H :  The earmarking of a contribution influences the willingness to contribute and therefore, 
the selection of taxpayers between combinations of contributions.  
The two influential factors studied, labeling and earmarking, are not completely free from 
overlap, since the name of a contribution could be understood by taxpayers as a signal for the 
appropriation. However, it is possible to differentiate between a contribution with “lower” 
appropriation (solely by labeling of the contribution) and a contribution with “higher” 
appropriation (by a promised use): How does a “vague signal” for a possible appropriation 
(e.g., solidarity surcharge in Germany) act compared to clearly signaled earmarking, which is 
certain upon introduction of the contribution? 
 
3.2 Method 
The testing of the hypotheses mentioned above was carried out based on two conjoint 
analyses. A conjoint analysis consists of a procedure that was originally developed in the field 
of psychology (Luce and Tukey 1964) and later also found widespread use in market research 
(Green and Srinivasan 1978, pp. 103f.). In a conjoint analysis, study participants are assigned 
the task of evaluating various bundles of attributes (“stimuli”) according to their preferences 
(CONsider JOINTly), either by explicit evaluation (rating) or by indicating an order of 
precedence based on advantageousness (ranking). A bundle of attributes contains independent 
factors whereby each factor is described by a specific value called level. It is a multivariate 
technique and based on the premise that subjects evaluate the value of an object by combining 
the separate amounts of value provided by different attributes. The most fundamental concept 
and the conceptual basis for measuring value in conjoint analysis is the utility, a subjective 
judgment of preference unique to each individual (Hair et al. 2008, p. 266). The measured 
total utility of the various bundles of attributes are used to calculate part worth utilities and the 
relative importance of the single attributes. A conjoint analysis also consists of a 
decompositional procedure, which generally assumes an additive relationship of the part 
worth utilities with regard to the total utility (Hair et al. 2008). The advantage of the 
procedure is that study participants can holistically evaluate the objects to be analyzed, such 
that the demands on the study participants are lower and biases due to cognitively directed 
over/under weighting can be avoided. As a result, the conjoint analysis can be used to split up 
the total utility of a bundle of attributes into the part worth utilities of the individual attributes   11
and their relative weights. Since, in a conjoint analysis, the study participants have to give a 
simultaneous evaluation of different attributes, they must consider the same trade-off effects 
between the individual attributes that also exist in reality.
 1    
It would also be conceivable to directly question the study participants regarding willingness 
to contribute. However, the majority of study participants were not in a position to give 
consistent estimates of the burden which also take such trade-off effects into account. The 
study participants would probably tend to rate all attributes as especially important and 
therefore, overestimate the individual attributes in a bundle of attributes. The procedure of 
conjoint analysis was therefore chosen since it sets much lower demands on the study 
participants.  
We consider that conjoint analyses are an applicable method for tax issues because of the 
advantages named above. In the field of marketing research, the conjoint analysis has been a 
standard method for several years. To this point, for tax issues, the application area of 
conjoint analysis is limited, but a conjoint analysis has already been used sporadically to 
measure tax effects. Milliron and Toy (1988) adopt conjoint analysis to research influential 
factors with regard to tax compliance. Hundsdoerfer and Sichtmann (2009) investigate the 
influence of taxation on investment decisions with the help of conjoint analysis. Blaufus and 
Ortlieb (2009) study the influence of tax complexity on employee decisions regarding 
company pension plans. To our knowledge, conjoint analysis has not yet been used to 




The data collection took place in December, 2008, and January, 2009, in the form of 
standardized face-to-face interviews with specially trained interviewers. In addition to the 
conjoint analysis, further questions were asked regarding demographic attributes, the general 
assessment of fiscal policy, and individual knowledge of German income tax law. The survey 
lasted an average of 20 minutes per study participant. Study participants were selected from 
among gainfully employed individuals, since these persons could be considered as being 
burdened by taxes and other contributions and thus, have experience with the German system 
of contributions. Gainfully employed individuals include, for purposes of this survey, all 
                                                 
1   A  partition dependence effect is avoided by using a complete stimuli design containing all possible 
combinations of attributes. See Fox et al. (2005, p. 539) for further details.    12
employees, public officials, and self-employed workers. Short interruptions to employment, 
for instance due to parental leave, maternity leave, etc. were not problematic.  
The selection of study participants followed a quota schedule
2 which corresponded pro rata 
with the total working population in terms of the attributes of gender, age, education, and 
income level. The corresponding frequency in the population for the year 2006 was taken 
from the 2008 statistical almanac from the Federal Statistical Office in Germany, in which 37 
million people comprised the working population in Germany. This was done to avoid bias 
from a non-representative composition of the sample since a representative random sample 
was not possible for financial reasons.  
The conjoint analysis was conducted with a total of 542 study participants. This group was 
divided into two subgroups: 274 study participants (non-earmarking group) received no 
additional information about the appropriation of the contribution “education allowance”, 
whereas 268 study participants (earmarking group) received additional information regarding 
the concrete use of the contribution. Compliance with the quota schedule was statistically 
tested. No significant difference between sample and population could be detected at the 5% 
level of confidence, and the sample can therefore be seen as representative in regard to the 
studied traits. The majority of the interviews took place in Berlin and its surroundings. We 
controlled for differences between study participants from the former Western and Eastern 
Germany. More than twenty years after the end of the German division, we did not find 
differences between these groups in the data set. In addition, no significant difference could 
be identified between the two groups in the sample (non-earmarking group and earmarking 
group) with respect to the quota schedule at the 5% level of confidence. 







                                                 
2   Quota samples do not strictly fulfill the requirements of a pure random selection. Nevertheless, they are the 
most widely used procedure in marketing research and consistently yield good results in comparative studies 
with pure random selection (see Green et al. 1988, pp. 325-327).   13
Table 1 - Distribution of Quota Attributes 




Male  291  53.7 %  54.8 % 
Gender 
Female  251  46.3 %  45.2 % 
Under 20 Years  20  3.7 %  3.5 % 
20 – 29 Years  93  17.2 %  17.5 % 
30 – 39 Years  127  23.4 %  24.0 % 
40 – 49 Years  152  28 %  29.6 % 
50 – 59 Years  115  21.2 %  20.5 % 
Age 
Over 60 Years  35  6.5 %  5.1 % 
No School Leaving 
















Diploma  86  15.9 %  14.5 % 
University Degree  101  18.6 %  16.0 % 
Education
3 
Other  44  8.1 %  9.1 % 
Under 1,000 Euro  164  30.3 %  32.7 % 
1,000 – 2,000 Euro  253  46.7 %  44.8 % 
2,000 – 3,000 Euro  82  15.1 %  14.6 % 
Over 3,000 Euro  38  7.0 %  8.0 % 
Monthly Net Income 
Not Stated  5  0.9 %  --- 
 
                                                 
3    Lower Secondary School is the equivalent to the German “Hauptschule” while Secondary School is 
equivalent to the German “Realschule” and University-Entrance Diploma is equivalent to the German 
“Abitur”.   14
3.4 Operationalization of the Hypotheses 
The research objects consist of a combination of contributions which must be paid by the 
study participants. The study participants were placed in a fictitious situation in which they 
were asked to rank
4 combinations of contributions according to their preferences in 
determining the fiscal policy for an (unnamed) political party.
5 The stimuli were presented to 
the study participants simultaneously on a table in front of them to make sure that the 
respondents fully understood and considered all the alternatives. 
Every possible combination assumed a constant gross pay of 3,000 Euro. This gross pay was 
then reduced by three different contributions, i.e., deductions (factors). These deductions 
included a general income tax, a health insurance premium, and a newly introduced 
educational allowance. The factor levels were 700 or 740 Euro for income tax, 200 or 280 
Euro for compulsory health insurance premiums, and 0 or 60 Euro for the education 
allowance. We explicitly advised the study participants that the health insurance premiums are 
independent of their actual received health insurance payments. Due to this advice our 
reference taxpayer will not pay a higher health insurance premium, independent of whether 
the taxpayer places some value on health benefits. 
The net pay was also given for each stimulus to prevent arithmetic errors from distorting the 
study participants’ results. There were a total of eight different possible combinations in the 
study (complete design), which were to be ranked by study participants during the course of 
the analysis according to their preferences. Each stimulus received a different level 
combination of the three factors (income tax, compulsory health insurance, education 
allowance).  
The individual contribution combinations of the stimuli in the complete design are presented 






                                                 
4    This ranking is the most common valuation procedure after the rating scale. An overview of various 
procedures can be found in Green and Srinivasan (1978, pp. 104f). 
5   To avoid a political party framing effect the name of the political party was unspecified.    15
Table 2 - Contribution Combinations of Stimuli in Complete Design 





A  low  = 700 €  no  low  = 200 € 
B  low  = 700 €  yes   (60 €)  high = 280 € 
C  high  = 740 €  yes   (60 €)  low  = 200 € 
D  high  = 740 €  no  high = 280 € 
E  high  = 740 €  no  low  = 200 € 
F  low  = 700 €  yes   (60 €)  low  = 200 € 
G  high  = 740 €  yes   (60 €)  high = 280 € 
H  low  = 700 €  no  high = 280 € 
 
The study participants were asked to assign the lowest rank in the sequence to the stimulus 
with their highest preference and the highest rank to the stimulus with their lowest preference. 
After a study participant had completed the sequence, the interviewer once again mentioned 
the possibility of making changes. When the study participant did not wish to make further 
changes, the final sequence was documented by the interviewer. The use of the education 
allowance was not stipulated in the first conjoint analysis (non-earmarking). In this case, 
explicit information was given to the study participants that tax revenue from the education 
allowance went into the general national budget and was not earmarked. In the second 
conjoint analysis (earmarking), study participants received detailed information regarding the 
use of the education allowance: Twenty-five percent of revenues from the education 
allowance were to be used for preschool education in nursery schools and day-care centers for 
children, 25% for improvements to colleges and universities, and 50% for improvements to 
schools and vocational schools. The sequences we collected can be used to test the initial 
hypothesis (hypothesis H1). Each sequence created by a study participant can be compared 
with the reference sequence that a net income maximizing individual would choose in order to 
maximize his/her net income.  
   16
4. Results 
4.1 Analysis of Ranking Behavior 
The reference model of a net income maximizing individual provides a reference point for the 
examination of the empirically observed rank order of the preferred contribution system. This 
net income maximizing decision maker will always aim to minimize his/her contribution 
burden and therefore, maximize his/her net income.  
Table 3 shows the total contributions and the maximum attainable net income of the 
individual stimuli. 
Table 3 - Total Contributions and Net Income 
Stimulus  Total Contributions  Net Income 
A  900 €  2,100 € 
B  1,040 €  1,960 € 
C  1,000 €  2,000 € 
D  1,020 €  1,980 € 
E  940 €  2,060 € 
F  960 €  2,040 € 
G  1,080 €  1,920 € 
H  980 €  2,020 € 
 
If one ranks the stimuli according to the maximum attainable net income, this results in the 
following reference sequence 
AEFHCDBG, 
since in this case, the stimulus with the highest net pay is ranked in first place and the ranking 
of the stimuli follows the total contributions.  
In order to check how many study participants followed the example of the net income 
maximizing decision maker, Table 4 provides an overview of the number of net income 
maximizing sequences in the total sample.  
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Reference 142  26.2  % 
Other 400  73.8  % 
 
Table 4 shows that the vast majority of study participants decided against a net income 
maximizing sequence. This result cannot be caused by arithmetic errors, since the exact net 
pay (gross pay – contributions) was indicated for every stimulus. Thus, net income 
maximization simply required the sorting of the stimuli according to net pay. Only 26.20% 
(142 individuals) of the study participants ranked all of the stimuli according to the reference 
rank order. A total of 73.80 % (400 individuals) instead chose another sequence. A t-test 
confirms that the deviations from the reference behavior are statistically significant (p-value < 
0.01).  
Table 5 shows the rank placement of the individual stimuli in the total sample: 
 
Table 5 - Average Rank Placement of the Individual Stimuli 
Stimulus N  Median  Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Stimulus A (L-L-L)  542  1  2.63  2.090 
Stimulus B (L-H-H)  542  7  5.38  2.067 
Stimulus C (H-H-L)  542  5  4.01  1.645 
Stimulus D (H-L-H)  542  6  6.29  1.426 
Stimulus E (H-L-L)  542  3  3.79  2.049 
Stimulus F (L-H-L)  542  3  2.75  1.641 
Stimulus G (H-H-H)  542  8  6.56  1.966 
Stimulus H (L-L-H)  542  4  4.58  1.557 
 
The mean value is of particular interest. The mean indicates the average rank placement of a 
stimulus over the total sample. According to this average rank placement, we have the 
following sequence of stimuli:  
AFECHBDG.   18
From Table 5, it becomes apparent that: 
  Stimulus A has the lowest mean and therefore, on average, the best rank placement. 
This reflects the behavior of a net income maximizer. The same is true of stimulus G, 
which was valued as being the worst, both in net income maximization and on average 
in the sample. 
  The sequence of stimuli according to the average of the study participants (mean) 
deviates from the sequence of stimuli in net income maximization. This leads to the 
assumption that the study participants do not follow the principle of net income 
maximization in their decision making.  
Therefore, the behavior of the decision maker cannot be explained or predicted using the 
assumption of a pure net income maximizer. Thus, Hypothesis H1 can be rejected. A further 
step must be used to test to what extent this deviation can be explained through the labeling of 
the contribution “education allowance” and the contribution “health insurance premium” 
(hypothesis H2) as well as the earmarking of the contribution “education allowance” 
(hypothesis H3). 
 
4.2 Influence of Labeling  
4.2.1 Education Allowance 
According to hypothesis H2, the labeling of a contribution leads to a change in the willingness 
to contribute and therefore, to a shift in contribution preferences. Thus, a contribution labeled 
as an “education allowance” should, according to hypothesis H2, be evaluated differently by 
study participants from other contributions in a system of contribution combinations. Labeling 
the contribution as an “education allowance” affects the willingness to contribute twice. First 
the contribution is labeled as an “allowance” and not as a “tax”. Second, the label “education” 
suggests the designation for education purposes. In hypothesis H2, we consider that this label 
increases the willingness to contribute. In order to eliminate bias in the effect of labeling, 
which is caused by the explicitly named appropriation of the education allowance 
(earmarking), the influence of labeling was first analyzed separately within the non-
earmarking group.  
Conjoint analysis makes it possible for each study participant to measure the part worth 
utilities of the individual attributes for his/her own sequence. Therefore the differences 
between the average of all ranks and the empirical ranks for each factor value were calculated.   19
This difference is the part worth utility of an individual factor level, which was standardized 
for comparison. The part worth utility is therefore a measure of the value that a study 
participant attaches to a factor level within the total attribute bundle. The estimation 
procedure is analogous to multiple regressions with dummy variables, but the calculations are 
done for each respondent separately, and it differs from other techniques dealing with 
relationships across all respondents. (For detailed information about the estimation technique 
see Hair et al. (2008 p. 269)). In this conjoint analysis, the part worth utility represents the 
utility that a study participant assigns to a contribution in a certain amount. The part worth 
utilities are used to cause a deviation in the individual willingness to pay a contribution. A 
high part worth utility denotes a high willingness to pay a contribution compared with the 
total willingness to pay the bundle of contributions. 
As a means of comparison, the part worth utilities of the attributes could also be measured for 
a net income maximizer who ranks the stimuli solely according to the attainable net pay 
(Hundsdoerfer and Sichtmann 2009). In this way, we can test whether study participants 
assign a systematically higher value to the factor level “education allowance is levied” as it 
would be the case in the reference model. The correlation between the total utility of a 
stimulus and the individual part worth utility is – as is customary in conjoint analysis – 
assumed to be additive. This means that the sum of the individual part worth utilities of the 
attributes of a stimulus corresponds to the total utility.
6 Table 6 shows the standardized
7 part 
worth utilities and relative significance that result from the sample
8 as well as the respective 










                                                 
6   This conclusion is based on the assumption that the explanatory variables do not interact, see Hair et al. 
(2008).  
7   The part worth utilities were standardized on a uniform scale of measurement and with a uniform zero-point. 
8   The sample here refers only to the non-earmarking group.    20
Table 6 - Part Worth Utilities and Relative Significance (Non-Earmarking Group) 
  Standardized Part Worth 
Utility (in %) 
Relative Significance 
(in %) 
 Reference  Sample  Reference  Sample 
Income Tax high  0.00  1.12 
Income Tax low  20.00  19.74 
20.00 20.86 
Education Allowance  0.00  12.92 
No Education Allowance  33.33  27.29 
33.33 40.21 
Health Insurance high  0.00  1.53 
Health Insurance low  46.67  37.40  46.67 38.93 
 
In particular Table 6 shows that the part worth utilities for the education allowance in the 
sample deviate from the part worth utilities of the net income maximizing reference model. 
These results can be interpreted as follows: Whereas the characteristic “no education 
allowance” of a stimulus for our reference study participant accounts for 1/3 (33.33%) of the 
maximum total utility, this is only 27.29% for the average study participant.
9 This result 
suggests that a contribution declared to be an education allowance finds wider acceptance 
than income tax.  
A total of 76 of the 274 study participants in this part sample (non-earmarking group) 
preferred stimuli that levied the education allowance, so the part worth utility (mean) for the 
attribute “education allowance is levied” is at 12.92% and so clearly greater than for the 
reference point (part worth utility for this factor level = 0). Across all study participants, the 
difference between the part worth utility mean of the attributes “no education allowance” and 
“education allowance is levied” (27.29%-12.92% = 14.37%) showed that an increase in the 
education allowance from 0 to 60 € would burden the study participants to a lesser degree 
than would an increase in income taxes of 40 € (difference = 19.74% - 1.12% = 18.62%). This 
result shows that the willingness to pay the high education allowance is higher than the 
willingness to pay the high income tax. A t-test confirms the statistically significant deviation 
of the part worth utility for the factor level “education allowance is levied” from the reference 
value (p-value < 0.01). 
                                                 
9   For a rational, self interested study participant any label itself is without any importance, only the increase in 
net income for the characteristic “no education allowance” is important.    21
Thus, in the evaluation of the attribute “education allowance is levied”, many study 
participants apparently include not only the decrease in their consumption potential, but also 
attach positive importance to the promotion of education.  
If study participants were willing to pay the education allowance and to relinquish a portion of 
their net income irrespective of how high the additional expenses were, then the sequence 
selected by these study participants would appear as follows:  
FCBGAEHD.  
Here the sequence of the study participants corresponds to the reference sequence (net income 
maximizing) in regard to the attributes income tax and health insurance. However, the stimuli 
with the factor level “education allowance is levied” occupy the first four places. It’s a matter 
of an extreme case of endorsement for the education allowance. Table 7 reflects the frequency 
of this sequence compared to the reference sequence for the non-earmarking group (NE): 
  
Table 7 - Sequences “Pro Education Allowance” with Non-Earmarking 
Ranking 







Reference  80  29.20 %  142 (26.20%) 
Pro Education 
Allowance  14  5.11 %  47 (8.67%) 
Other  180  65.69 %  353 (65.13%) 
Sum  274  100.00 %  542 (100.00%) 
 
Table 7 shows that a total of 14 out of 274 study participants are willing to pay the education 
allowance. A binomial test can also be used to show that the number of sequences carried out 
in this form present no statistically random result. Therefore, it can also be proven that a 
significant percentage of study participants intentionally chose the strategy “pro education 
allowance” instead of “contribution minimization” and therefore, chose the contributions with 
additional expenses. This clearly already appears sufficient to provide a contribution with a 
positive description. Hypothesis H2 is therefore confirmed for the education allowance: The 
willingness to pay a contribution depends upon its labeling.   22
4.2.2 Health Insurance Premium 
In addition to the previously established positive influence of the label “education allowance”, 
we analyzed whether the labeling of a contribution as “health insurance premium” influenced 
the willingness to contribute in contrast to a general income tax. In order to study this aspect, 
we divided the sample into two subgroups. We sub-divided each data set in such a manner as 
if the study participants had ranked each individual stimulus with an education allowance and 
without an education allowance. Therefore, two fictitious conjoint analyses per study 
participant were generated, each with four stimuli, in which only the attributes “income tax” 
and “health insurance premium” were varied and the education allowance remained constant 
(in one case 60 Euro and in the other case 0 Euro). So the labeling effect of the health 
insurance premium compared to the income tax could be isolated. 
The calculated part worth utilities can be taken from Table 8. 
 
Table 8 - Part Worth Utilities separated by Groups “Education Allowance” and “No Education 
Allowance” 











Allowance  31.86%  3.32% 61.75% 3.08% 
No Education 




33.33%  0.00% 66.67% 0.00% 
 
The willingness to pay the health insurance premium is noticeably higher in both groups than 
it would be under net income maximization.
10 Thus, the term “health insurance premium” 
seems to be positive in comparison to income tax, or the study participants have – in contrast 
                                                 
10   The margin between low and high income tax is 40 Euro, which is half of the margin between the low and 
high health insurance premium. Accordingly, under net income maximization the part-worth utilities of the 
low income tax is half as high as for the low health insurance. For a comparison between the willingness to 
pay the health insurance premium and the income tax, the part worth utilities of the low income tax can be 
doubled. Then one recognizes – especially in the case without education allowance – the willingness to pay a 
higher health insurance premium is higher than to pay a higher income tax.    23
to the information that they received from us – associated a higher reward from compulsory 
health insurance with a higher health insurance premium.  
When the study participants were confronted with an education allowance (group “education 
allowance”), then the willingness to pay a high health insurance premium is less than in the 
case in which no education allowance is collected. For study participants who are more 
strongly burdened by a higher health insurance premium than through a low one (the normal 
case), we see a difference of 4.35 percentage points.
11 The economic intuition behind this 
result is obvious: If study participants are willing to pay for an education allowance, then their 
inclination to “voluntarily” pay a higher health insurance premium decreases. This result was 
controlled with a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test and is significant on a 10% level of 
confidence. Therefore, a labeling effect can also be determined for the health insurance 
premium. This effect diminishes when an education allowance exists simultaneously.  
 
4.3 Influence of Earmarking  
It was shown above that the labeling of a contribution can change its acceptance among study 
participants. It is doubtful whether this effect is affected when study participants are explicitly 
informed of the purpose for which this contribution is to be used. The additional revenue 
generated by this increase in contributions should be explicitly assigned a previously 
determined use (earmarking). As mentioned above, a subgroup of study participants were 
given additional information for this purpose. Study participants in this subgroup were 
explicitly informed of the use of the education allowance. 
The following part worth utilities resulted for the study participants who received this 
additional information. For comparison, the reference values as well as the results of the non-





                                                 
11   In order to be able to subtract the part worth utilities for the health insurance premium from one another, we 
excluded the study participants who had chosen a high health insurance premium over a low health insurance 
premium (“reversals”). For the low education allowance (N=504), one received a part worth utility of the low 
health insurance premium of 60.38%, and for the high education allowance (N=517), a part worth utility of 
64.73%. The number of reversals for a low education allowance (542-504=38) is higher than for a high 
education allowance (542-517=25), and this also supports the results.    24
Table 9 - Part Worth Utilities and Relative Significance (Earmarking Group) 
Part Worth Utility  Relative Significance 
 
Reference  Non-
Earmark  Earmark Reference  Non-
Earmark  Earmark 
Income Tax high  0.00 %  1.12 %  0.76 % 
Income Tax low  20.00 %  19.74 %  20.52 % 
20.00 %  20.86 %  21.28 % 
Education Allowance  0.00 %  12.92 %  24.54 % 
No Education Allowance  33.33 %  27.29 %  17.28 % 
33.33 %  40.21 %  41.82 % 
Health Insurance high  0.00 %  1.53 %  1.38 % 
Health Insurance low  46.67 %  37.40 %  35.67 % 
46.67 %  38.93 %  36.90 % 
 
In order to test whether there is a significant difference between the distribution within the 
earmarking and non-earmarking groups with regard to the acceptance of the education 
allowance, a Wilcoxon-/Mann-Whitney-U-Test was conducted. At a level of confidence less 
than 0.001%, the test showed that there is a significant shift in the distribution function 
between the two groups. In particular, the mean value of the part worth utility in the non-
earmarking group is 12.9% and in the earmarking group 24.5%. As such, the appropriation 
leads to an average increase in the part worth utility of an education allowance of 11.6%. 
With that, the individual willingness to contribute for the education allowance is significantly 
higher if the study participants were informed about the specific appropriation for the 
contribution. Therefore hypothesis H3 is confirmed: The appropriation of a contribution has 
an influence on the willingness to pay this contribution. The average willingness to pay the 
contribution “education allowance” increases further if the study participants are convinced of 
its validity not only through the labeling of the contribution, but also through its earmarking.  
In our study, the effect is so strong that – with earmarking – the education allowance no 
longer presents a net burden. This is shown in Table 9: The mean value of the part worth 
utilities of the high education allowance is more than 7 percentage points higher than the 
mean value of the part worth utilities of the low education allowance. Therefore, the high 
education allowance creates a higher total utility on average in the “earmarking” group than 
the low education allowance.  
Table 10 serves to clarify how many study participants in the earmarking group (E) 
consciously chose the high education allowance, but otherwise behaved as a net income 
maximizer.   25
Table 10 - Sequence “Pro Education Allowance” with Earmarking 




Participants  (E) 
Total Sample 
Reference  62  23.13 %  142 (26.20 %) 
Pro Education 
Allowance  33  12.31 %  47 (8.67 %) 
Other  173  64.55 %  353 (65.13 %) 
Sum  268  100.00 %  542 (100.00%) 
 
If one compares these results with the values in Table 7, it becomes clear that, in the 
earmarking group, a strikingly larger number of study participants chose the “pro education 
allowance” but otherwise chose the reference sequence (12.31%). This also confirms the 
hypothesis that the willingness to pay can be increased through the earmarking of a 
contribution. Thus, hypothesis H3 is also confirmed: In addition to the labeling of a 
contribution, the willingness to pay a contribution can be increased further if the contribution 
is earmarked for a special use, which appears to be seen as especially worthwhile by 
numerous study participants.  
 
4.4 Influence of Individual Attributes  
In order to test to what extent demographic data can explain the results, different non-
parametric test methods were carried out in which the dependent variable consisted of the part 
worth utility of a levied education allowance. Nonparametric test methods are appropriate 
because of the quality of the data. We separated the sample into different classes with respect 
to the education level, age, gender, children and income. We then tested each class against the 
other for differences with respect to their part worth utility for the high education allowance. 
As test methods the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test for two class comparisons and the 
Kruskal-Wallis-Test for testing more than two classes are applied. Table 11 provides an 
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Table 11 - Explanation of the Labeling Effect with respect to individual attributes 
Test classes  Test method  Results 
Earmarking vs. Non-Earmarking  Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney-Test 
p<0.001***; Earmark: 
Mean: 12.92%; 95% Konf.: 
10.1-15.75%; Non-
Earmark: Mean: 24.54%; 
95% Conf: 21.07-28.00% 
Education level (at least 
University-Entrance Diploma vs. 
Secondary School Leaving 








Income level (<1000; -2000; -
3000; >3000) 
Kruskal-Wallis-
Test  not significant 
Age (<=20; -30; -40; -50; -60; 
>60) 
Kruskal-Wallis-
Test  not significant 
Gender  Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney-Test  not significant 
Children  Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney-Test  not significant 
 
Other than for the attribute earmarking, no significant influence of the demographic attributes 
on the willingness to pay the education allowance with the exception of the education level 
can be determined. Solely the attribute “Lower Secondary School” allows the conclusion to 
be drawn at a 5% level of confidence that students at a lower secondary school tend to be less 
willing to voluntarily pay for education than students with at least a University-Entrance 
Diploma.
13 It is conspicuous that the test for the class “children” is not significant: We 
expected that those who have children may regard an education allowance as a positive 
benefit, which affect the perceived consumption possibilities for the family. However, no 
significant differences between taxpayers with and without children regarding the acceptance 
of the “education allowance” were found. We conducted the same tests for the dependent 
variable high health insurance premium, but without any significant results. 
                                                 
12   We excluded the class “No school leaving certificate” because of the small sample size and the class 
“Others” because of the lack of interpretability. 
13  This was confirmed via pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Tests. Only the test between the class “at least 
University-Entrance Diploma” and “Lower Secondary School Leaving Certificate” shows a significant result 
at a 5% level of confidence (p-value: 0.012).   27
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to test whether labeling and earmarking are useful instruments 
in increasing the willingness to pay a contribution. The model of a net income maximizer 
served as a reference, under which individuals attempt to avoid all contributions that do not 
provide a concrete reward. In order to test this question empirically, we applied the instrument 
of conjoint analysis. We polled 542 gainfully employed individuals in Germany. The task of 
the study participants was to rank various combinations of contributions. From these rankings, 
we derived part worth utilities and the relative significance of the attributes of the individual 
contributions, which we could then compare with part worth utilities and the relative 
significance of a fictitious net income maximizer.  
In the total sample, only one-fourth of the study participants actually chose the net income 
maximizing behavior described often by economic theory. The initial hypothesis that 
taxpayers always and exclusively strive to maximize their net pay and therefore, their 
consumption potential, must be rejected. The labeling of the contribution (as “income tax”, 
“health insurance premium”, or “education allowance”) and the description (earmarking) of 
the appropriation of the “education allowance” influence the willingness to pay this 
contribution. In order to distinguish the labeling effect and the earmarking effect from one 
another, study participants were divided into two subgroups, of which only one received 
additional information about the allocation of revenues from the education allowance. For the 
group that received no additional information regarding the allocation of funds, a statistically 
significant and economically relevant difference could be identified between the reference and 
the empirically proven sequencing behavior (labeling effect). It became clear that some study 
participants assigned a positive part worth utility to a high, but not concretely, earmarked 
education allowance although this is associated with a decrease in their net income. The 
labeling of a contribution therefore has an influence on its acceptance. A similar, yet weaker, 
effect in the same direction could be observed for the contribution “health insurance 
premium”. An appropriation of the contribution “education allowance” significantly 
strengthened this effect. On average, the study participants no longer described this 
contribution as a burden (negative net burden). 
For tax effects research, these results indicate that models that predict the conformance of 
decisions on general fiscal conditions based on the net income maximizing hypothesis and 
which fail to take into account either the labeling or the appropriation of contributions, may   28
lead to inaccurate predictions. Whether our conclusions for working persons also apply to 
firms remains an open research question.  
We suppose that the results found here are of great interest for future reforms to the tax and 
contribution systems. The labeling of a contribution and especially the definition of the use of 
the tax revenue generated led to an increase in the acceptance and willingness to pay among 
working individuals. An increase in acceptance likely also leads to diminished evasion and 
avoidance behavior and thus, to lower transaction costs and tax collection costs. Furthermore, 
our results approve that “labeling” and “earmarking” are important instruments for politicians 
in “selling” their tax or contribution policies.  
There are numerous links between the current study and possibilities for further research. For 
instance, the question arises as to what extent the labeling and appropriation of individual 
types of contributions can also lead to negative perceptions and therefore, to a decrease in the 
willingness to contribute. When interpreting our results, it should be considered that this study 
dealt solely with a pure preference sequence, which had no economic consequences for the 
study participant. There is a need for further research which validates these results in 
connection with actual monetary incentives. As previously mentioned, the potential to transfer 
the results for contributions that are levied at a corporate level also remains to be tested. 
Another research question for further studies is to analyze our results in a multiple shot setting 
in order to test for taxpayers’ “learning effects”.   29
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